Abstract. This paper investigates the problem of con dentiality violations via illegal data inferences that occur when arithmetic constraints are combined with non-con dential numeric data to infer con dential information. The database is represented as a point i n a n ( n+k)-dimensional constraint space, where n is the numberofnumerical data items stored in the database (extensional database) and k is the numberofderivable attributes (intensional database). Database constraints over both extensional and intensional databases form an (n + k)-dimensional constraint object. A query answer over a data item x is an interval I of values along the x axis of the database such that I is correct (i.e., the actual data value is within I ) and safe (i.e., users cannot infer which point within I is the actual data value). The security requirements are expressed by the accuracy with which users are allowed to disclose data items. More speci cally, w e d e v elop two classi cation methods: (1) volume-based classi cation, where the entire volume of the disclosed constraint object that contains the data item is considered and (2) interval based classi cation, where the length of the interval that contains the data item is considered. We develop correct and safe inference algorithms for both cases.
Introduction
Databases that contain con dential information require that users can access -directly or indirectly -only data for which they have the proper authorization. Direct data accesses are usually controlled by some form of lattice-based (mandatory) access control mechanisms BL75, Den76] . Each data request is evaluated by comparing the security level of the requested data with the security clearance of the user. If the security requirements are satis ed (i.e., the user's security clearance dominates the security classi cation of all data) the data access is permitted. It is rejected otherwise. However, lattice-based access control is insu cient t o p r e v ent secrecy violations via inferences when non-con dential data is combined with meta-data to derive con dential information. Moreover, the strict security requirements of mandatory access control may unnecessarily limit data availability. I n a n umber of applications it is desirable to provide a range of valid answers that would still allow the users to perform their jobs with limited authority while preserving con dentiality. F or example, military support services should be able to perform scheduled maintenance work without knowing the mission (e.g., destination) of the serviced equipment. This paper provides a framework to de ne exible security requirements on data and presents algorithms that compute correct and safe answers to queries. Intuitively correctness means that the actual data item is contained in the returned interval, and safety means that the user is not able to infer anything beyond what is released. Most indirect data accesses result from inferences combine non-con dential data with constraints. We illustrate an illegal inference using a military database that contains data about di erent military units, such a s t ypes and speci cations of their vehicles, destination distance, fuel and food supply (see Table 1 ). Assume that the attack strategy is that units B and C from the south engage in a longterm attack with the main force of the enemy while, unit A, t h a t i s e q u i p p e d with light w eapons and thus able to move fast, is summoned from the north to launch a surprise attack on the unprotected northern front o f t h e e n e m y. F i g . 1 shows the geographical locations of the units and the planned attacks. It is necessary that only authorized o cers of the command center and of the units A, B and C know about the surprise attack. However, keeping the military plan secret does not guarantee the secrecy of this information. Consider the situation when an enemy spy i s able to gain information about the amount o f fuel requested by the di erent units. Since the number of the vehicles of the units and the mileages of these vehicles are usually known, the amount of available fuel de nes the maximal travel distance and, therefore the potential destination of units. In our example, the knowledge of the destination of unit A would reveal the attack plan, thus reducing the strategic advantage of surprise.
How can we prevent such inferences? One possible solution is to keep fuel volume secret. However, this would severely limit data availability and require that all users accessing this information must be authorized to access information about the military plan as well. In this paper we present a di erent approach where users are allowed to access a range of possible data values but not the precise value. This exible solution allows us to preserve con dentiality and provides improved data availability compared to the previous approaches.
The inference problem in databases rst was considered in statistical databases where the security requirement is that aggregate information about groups of individuals can be released but no speci c information about an individual should be accessed (see Denning Den82] for survey). Illegal inferences revealing private information are based on the size of the database used to compute the statistics (e.g., number of individuals is a group) and/or the overlap among the queries requesting related information. However, researchers do not consider inferences raised by combining meta-data with non-con dential data to disclose con dential information. Since the beginning of 1980s, researchers, focusing on multi-level secure relational databases, identi ed the problem of indirect access to con dential data via combining meta-data with non-con dential data GM84,Mor88,SO87,Hin88,Smi90,Buc90,Den85,Thu87,MSS88,RJHS95,ST90]. However, these techniques often result in over-classi cation of data and, therefore reduce data availability. Moreover, most authors, with the exception of Den85,Hin88,SO91,DdVS99a,DdVS99b], do not consider the problem of actual inference for speci c families of constraints rather they develop a framework assuming that disclosure inference algorithms are readily available. It is our view, however, that the main technical di culty of solving the inference channel problem lies in developing inference algorithms that guarantee data con dentiality.
Finally, the existing inference prevention techniques, with the exception of RJHS95], are based on withholding answers from the users. We propose a new approach where con dentiality i n numeric databases is achieved by controlling the accuracy of the released data. Our model guarantees that no illegal data access is possible even in the presence of database dependencies while supporting maximal data availability. The work of Rath et. al RJHS95] is the closest to ours. They consider functional dependencies (FDs) to raise illegal imprecise inferences in databases containing numeric values. While their approach is secure, it is limited in the sense of considering FDs only and does not de ne security requirements in the context of range values.
In this paper we consider a data model consisting of a set of variables. A database is an instantiation of values to the variables that satis es the database (arithmetic) constraints. The database is represented as a single point i n a n ( n+ k)-dimensional space, where n is the number of data items stored in the database (extensional database) and k is the numberofvalues that can be derived from the stored data (intensional database). 1 The arithmetic constraints over extensional and intensional data form an (n + k)-dimensional constraint object. When a user requests a data value a range of possible values, represented as two new constraints, are generated and returned to the user.
The security requirements on the data items are expressed by the accuracy with which users are allowed to know the data values. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper that introduces a security model in which the classication of the data items is based on the precision of numeric answers and thus continuous. We propose two methods to assign security classi cation to the data items: rst, the entire volume of the constraint object that contains the data item is considered and second, the length of the interval that contains the data item is considered. While volume-based classi cation is easier to implement than the interval-based one, the second technique is more exible and it allows higher data availability. F or both methods we d e v elop algorithms that generate query answers which are correct (i.e., the data item is within the returned interval) and safe (i.e., the user is unable to infer which point within the answer is the actual data item).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we g i v e a detailed description of the considered problem and provide intuitive explanations of the concepts involved. In Section 3 we formally de ne the considered model and the security requirements. Sections 4 and 5 contain the algorithms to generate correct and safe query answers for volume and interval based classi cation methods, respectively. Finally, i n S e c t i o n 6 w e conclude and recommend new directions to extend our research.
Problem Formulation
This paper formalizes a security model applicable to numerical databases when a database instance is a vector of numerical values. Users and data items have s ecurity classi cations. Users (subjects) can access data (objects) through queries. Queries over numeric data return an interval of valid answers, such that the actual data is contained in the interval. The size (length) of the interval (i.e., precision of the released data) depends on the security classi cation of the requested data and the security clearance of the user. Precision of released information can be measured either by the length of the returned data interval or by t h e v olume of the valid constraint space de ned by this interval. The system presented in this paper ensures that the interval-based query answers do not allow the users to infer any unauthorized information. The research problem is formulated in terms of the following components: (1) data model of which the (numeric) instances consist of objects of discourse, (2) arithmetic constraints imposed upon the database, (3) security classi cations of users and data items, and (4) queries requesting numeric values.
The next section provides an example that will be used throughout this paper for illustrative purposes.
The Running Example
Consider the military database containing information about units A, B and C mentioned in the Introduction. It contains information about the number of vehicles, amount of fuel, destination distance, food supply, number of soldiers etc, as shown in Table 1 . Some of these attributes are such as amount of fuel are stored, while others such as the travel range is derivable. In addition, the database is expected to satisfy the following constraints.
number of soldiers 10 000 amount of fuel 20 000(gallon) numberofvehicles 45 3 amount of fuel travel range (miles) Users of the database are generals, military planners, eld commanders, eld soldiers, supply supervisors, supply personnel, press and general public. Based on their rank and tasks, users have di erent access rights to data items. For example, generals are allowed to access all the data in the database while supply personnels are allowed to access information related to supply but can not access information about the eld information of the units.
The queries in our model request numerical values, such a s amount of fuel used by the military unit A. Based on the data con dentiality (security c l a s s ication) the answer is a range of values. In calculating the returned range, we ensure that the user cannot infer other attribute ranges such a s t h e travel range of the military unit A more precisely than allowed by the security model. Note that we assume that all constraints are known to all users revealing additional information to the users about valid database values.
3 Data Model, Queries and Security Requirements
Data Model
The data model consists of two sets of attributes of numerical type, and a set of constraints over them.
Database Each entity of our model consists of a set of n attributes that are directly stored in the data base. Furthermore, there is a set of k derivable attributes, not stored in the database. Consequently, e v ery entity is viewe d a s a ( n+ k)-dimensional vector (a 1 : : : a n a n+1 : : : a n+k ) o f n umerical type. We s a y t h a t (n + k) is the dimension of the data model. The set x 1 : : : x n x n+1 : : : x n+k of variables represents attributes, and x 1 j a 1 : : : x n j a n x n+1 j a n+1 : : : x n+k j a n+k represent instantiations of values a 1 : : : a n+k to the variables. In the running example the attributes (variables) are unit name, soldiers, food supply, f u e l , number of vehicles, destination, fuel/vehicle, and travel range. The database is given in f(x 1 x 2 : : : x n x n+1 : : : x n+k ) b f(x 1 x 2 : : : x n x n+1 : : : x n+k ) > b where f is a function, x 1 : : : x n+k are variables, and b is a real number. 2 Let C be the conjunction of constraints of the above forms over variables x 1 : : : x n x n+1 : : : x n+k . C de nes an (n + k)-dimensional constraint object, that is all possible instances of database entities that satisfy C. 
Security Model
Multi-level secure relational database systems contain data classi ed at di erence security levels. Users of the database have security clearances assigned. Security classi cations and clearances are expressed by security labels that contain two components:(1) a hierarchical component (e.g., top-secret < secret < unclassi ed) and (2) a non-hierarchical categories (e.g., f supply, press, eldinfo g). Security labels form a lattice structure with the dominance ( ) among the labels. A data access is permitted if the security clearance label of the user dominates the security classi cation label of the requested data items. For example, in our model, the attribute destination distance of unit A could be classi ed as (top-secret, eld-info) and only o cers with security clearances that dominates (top-secret, eld-info) are allowed to access this data, e.g., generals, with security clearance (top-secret,fpress,supply, eld-infog). H o wever, supply o cers with security clearance (top-secret, supply) are not allowed to access this data. For simplicity, we assume that the subjects of our security model are the users. 3 To de ne the security objects of our model, it is necessary to understand what information a user gains if a query is answered. Let us give an intuitive explanations before formally de ning the objects and their security classi cations of our model. . Intuitively, the size of the constraint object (or its projection) known by t h e user to contain the database represents how accurately the user knows the actual data value. The smaller the volume (projection), the more accurate the user's knowledge about the actual data values. We assume that all possible instances of an entity within a constraint space have the same probability to be the actual database, i.e., the database is uniformly distributed within the constraint object. We use the properties of the constraint object, such as volume, projection, to de ne the security requirements on the data items.
De nition 1. (Volume and Projection of a constraint Object)
Let C be a n (n + k)-dimensional constraint object. The volume of C is de ned as the volume of the (n+k)-dimensional geometrical shape. The projection of C on axis x (data item x) i s a n i n t e r v a l a 1 a 2 ], w h e r e a 1 and a 2 are the minimal and maximal values along the x axis de ned b y C.
In this papers we present t wo approaches to de ne the security of objects in our database. First, we use the volume of C as the security object. While this method is simple and can be easily implemented, it does not allow to assign di erent sensitivity levels to the di erent data items. 4 Second, we propose a 1em 3 Usually in security, a distinction is made between the users and the principals (subjects) acting on behalf of them. 1em 4 Same as database level of security granularity in relational databases. security classi cation based on projections of C to represent the security restrictions on the individual data items. This method is enhanced by a probability measurement that incorporates the shape of the constraint object, which i s n o t re ected in the projection. The second approach allows not only the assignment of di erent security classi cations to the individual data items but also, to represent partial disclosure. The following sections contain the detailed descriptions of the two methods and algorithms that generate safe query answers according to the security restrictions.
Security by Volume
In this section we present a security model in which the absolute volumes of the disclosed (known by the user to contain the database) constraint objects are used to represent the sensitivity of the database.
De nition 2. (Volume Objects)
Let l 1 : : : l k be a set of security labels and C a constraint object with volume V . F or each security label l i i = 1 : : : k we create a volume object, denoted b y V li , a s f o l l o w s :
1. V li V , i.e., the volume object must be smaller than the volume of the constraint object.
2. If l i l j then V li V lj , i.e., volume objects at lower security levels can not be smaller than volume objects at higher security level.
The secrecy of the database is violated if a user with security clearance l i is able to disclose a constraint object with volume less than V li . We propose a security mechanism based on controlling the volume of the constraint object disclosed by the user. For this approach it is necessary that the original constraint object C is bounded from every direction.
To visualize the security classi cations, consider Fig. 2 . The shaded area de nes the valid data values. Since knowing that the database must satisfy the constraints, the user knows that the available fuel per vehicle cannot exceed 444 gallons (maximum 20,000 gallons fuel available for each unit divided by t h e minimum numberofvehicles 45 for each unit) and, therefore, the maximal travel distance (3 times the available gallons of fuel per vehicle) is less than or equal to 1332 miles. The actual value of available fuel for each v ehicle of unit A is 200 gallons, and the destination distance is 400 miles. The total volume of the valid constraint space is 295,704.
Assume, that in addition to the constraints of the database, the user knows that the amount of fuel available per vehicle is between 150 and 300 gallons. Clearly, the user's knowledge about the fuel is more accurate now than before.
The darkly shaded area of i.e., released information is more a c curate at higher security level.
The algorithm given in Fig. 4 generates a correct, safe and e cient query answer. It uses a random number generator based on the uniform distribution. To ensure that the algorithm terminates, we use a threshold value 100,000 to limit the number of trials to generate correct, safe, and e cient query answer. If no such answer is found, the algorithm returns a default answer, that is the minimal and maximal valid values de ned by the constraint object. has the same probability to be the database, i.e., the database is uniformly distributed within C 0 . Also, since any new information about a data item is fully contained in the previous answers thus no possibly hazardous overlap can occur. 4. E ciency: Follows from step 7.II.a.
Returning back to our running example, assume that the answer given as a result of a query made by a user with clearance (secret,press) for the amount o f fuel used by u n i t A is 150 300], as given by F i g . 3 . F urthermore assume that the volume objet associated with this security l e v el is V (secret press) = 1 5 0 000. Since the volume of the restricted constraint object as given is 101,250, the answer is correct, safe, and e cient (but not optimal).
Security by Interval
Similarly to the previous section, the information disclosed by a user is re ected in the constraint object by this users. However, in this section we explore a exible security classi cation that is based on the projection of the constraint object on the data items. The proposed method allows the security o cer to individually classify each d a t a i t e m .
First, let us give an intuitive example. Consider the military database we presented earlier and assume that the travel range is more sensitive than the amount of fuel, e.g., the enemy (public) is not allowed to deduce the travel range with accuracy of 200 miles, while fuel information is allowed for release within 50 gallons range, e.g., each v ehicle has fuel between 180 and 230 gallons. However, by releasing this fuel information, the travel range is reduced to 690 ;540 = 150 miles. While the security requirement i s satis ed for fuel, it is clearly violated for travel range.
Moreover, it is possible, that the security o cer would like to consider disclosures, where the data item is not fully disclosed within a g i v en interval size but has high probability. Note, that we assumed that originally the database is uniformly distributed within the constraint object C. Because of this uniform distribution, the probability that the database is within a sub-object C =V . This observation allows the security o cer to protect data from partial disclosures. For example, we c a n assign that users with unclassi ed security clearances are not allowed to know t h e travel distance within 100 miles with probability 85%.
De nition 4. (Interval objects) Let x 1 : : : x n+k be a database, l 1 : : : l h a set of security labels and C a constraint object with volume V . F or each data item x i i = 1 : : : n +k and for each security label l j j = 1 : : : h we create an interval object, denoted b y (I ij p ij ), as follows:
1. I ij de nes the smallest interval length (accuracy) with which users with security clearances l j are a l l o w e d to know the value of x i with probability p ij . 2. If l s l r and p is = p ir then I is I ir , i.e., interval size of an object at a low security level can not be smaller than the interval size of the same object at high security level.
3. If l s l r and I is = I ir then p is p ir , i.e., if two interval sizes of a data item are the same at di erent security levels, then the high security level can not have lower probability assigned t o t h a n t h e l o w s e curity level.
Intuitively, g i v en a data item x and its interval object (I p ) at security l e v el l, the secrecy of x is violated if a user with security clearance l is able to disclose a constraint object C such t h a t C contains a sub-object C 0 , with projection size on x smaller than or equal to I, that contains the database with probability higher than p. We propose a security mechanism to control the length of the answer interval returned to the user ensure that the security requirements are satis ed. This approach does not require that the original constraint object is bounded. Step 6) and the points a 1 (Steps 4,5) and a 2 (Steps 7,8), Algorithm 2 ensures that the data value a is within the generated interval.
3. Safety: (a) By verifying for every data item that no disallowed interval object is disclosed (Step 12), Algorithm 2 ensures that the security requirements are not violated. Further, (b) by using a random number generator based on the uniform distribution, any p o i n t within the restricted constraint structure C 0 has the same probability to be the database, i.e., the database is uniformly distributed within C 0 . Similarly to the security classi cations via volume objects, note that any new information about a data item is fully contained in the previous answers thus no possibly hazardous overlap can occur.
Note, that since we do not enforce any restriction on the correlation of interval size and probability w e can't de ne e cient answer similarly to the volume based model. However, if one of these measurements are xed, e.g., all interval objects given with 0.8 probability, w e can de ne e ective a n s w er similarly to the volume based method.
Conclusions
We have presented a model to specify the accuracy with which users are allowed to access numeric values. As shown, restrictions can be enforced either on the volume of the disclosed constraint object that surrounds the protected data items, or on the interval of a speci c data value. While volume based accuracy is easier to enforce than the interval based one, the later provides more exibility, therefore improved data availability. We developed algorithms to compute correct and safe answers to queries for both measures of accuracy.
Finally, w e conclude by recommending further research directions. Currently our algorithms provide an e ectively accurate answer that is not optimal, i.e., the most accurate value allowed to the user. While we believe it is impossible to provide a general algorithm that generates safe, correct, and optimal query answer such a method may exist for restricted families of arithmetic constraints. Also, in this paper we considered queries that request the value of a single data item. Our work could be extended to incorporate queries requesting several data items simultaneously and incorporating selection conditions. Finally, t h e i n terval based accuracy can handle sets of sensitive i n tervals and probabilities for each data item. For example, a data item x may be accessed by a user only if none of the classi cations (I x1 p x1 ) : : : (I x k p x k ) is violated.
